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SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Louis J. Virelli III*
In an increasingly polarized society, claims of animussingling out an individual or group based on bias, disfavor, or
disapproval-are becoming more frequent and intense. When
these claims are directed at government actors, they implicate
serious questions of constitutional law. This is reflected in two
recent high-profile decisions by the United States Supreme Court.
In Trump v. Hawaii,'the Court addressed claims of animus by the
executive branch against Muslim immigrants. In Masterpiece
Cakeshop,2 the Court evaluated whether a state civil rights
commission acted out of animus when it ordered a defendant to
comply with state anti-discrimination laws in contravention of his
religious beliefs.
Despite the increasing prominence of animus claims, courts
have been slow to develop a coherent animus doctrine. In his
important and timely recent book, Animus: A Short Introduction
to Bias in the Law,3 Professor Bill Araiza tackles this difficult
problem by offering a novel and nuanced approach to incorporating
animus into equal protection law. This symposium brings together
preeminent scholars in the field to offer much-deserved attention
to Professor Araiza's work. The following pages describe and
develop those ideas, providing valuable insight and food for
thought regarding the role of animus in constitutional law.
Quite fittingly, the first piece is from Professor Araiza himself.
In Call It By Its Name,4 Professor Araiza outlines the themes of his
book and makes a compelling case for the usefulness and viability
of animus doctrine. He begins by emphasizing the value of animus
as an accurate descriptor of legislative motivations in certain
cases. By identifying animus as its own category of discriminatory

* @ 2019. Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law.
1. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
3. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017).

4. William D. Araiza, Call It By Its Name, 48 STETSON L. REV. 181 (2018).
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treatment, we are able to properly situate it in the larger landscape
of equal protection law, and to adopt standards of review for
animus cases that better reflect animus's uniquely corrosive effect
on our constitutional democracy. This is especially important,
Professor Araiza argues, due to the "reality of our current politics
[ ] that racism, xenophobia, and bias of all types ha[ve] acquired a
new respectability." To the extent government action is motivated
by a desire to push back against successful social movements,
Professor Araiza reminds us that, "[in] a world where backlash is
written into law, law must answer it by identifying the
phenomenon for what it is ... animus."'
In addition to the benefits of identifying animus cases as such,
Professor Araiza points out that animus doctrine has a historical
pedigree. He ties modern animus jurisprudence-reflected
primarily in four Supreme Court cases 7 -to nineteenth century
disputes over class legislation. Although he admits they are not
perfect analogues, Professor Araiza finds common ground in the
criticisms of both categories of government action-the desire to
"promote a private-regarding interest," rather than "the public
good."8 This connection, he argues, offers another example of how
and why we should treat animus cases as a subset of equal
protection law. By recognizing different forms of inequality for
what they are-including animus-Professor Araiza suggests that
we can tailor judicial review to better recognize "that different
sorts of cases raise different type[s] of equal protection risks, and
thus call for different types of judicial investigation."9 This
willingness to accept various approaches to equal protection
review answers critiques that animus doctrine could become an
"all-purpose argument," and instead frees animus to play its

5. Id. at 186.
6. Id. at 187-88.
7. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). This list of course omits the two recent cases mentioned
above-Trump v. Hawaii and Masterpiece Cakeshop-both of which are recent examples of
cases in which the Court referred to animus in its analysis. Masterpiece Cakeshop is not an
equal protection case, so it is somewhat anomalous to the current discussion. Trump v.
Hawaii is too recent to be part of the historical canon of animus cases, and implicates
executive power over immigration, which makes its credentials as an animus case per se
less clear.
8. Araiza, supra note 4, at 188.
9. Id. at 191.
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"beneficial roles" in pursuing perhaps our most important
constitutional principles of justice and equality. 10
Professor Katie Eyer's response to Professor Araiza targets
the potential negative consequences of encouraging courts to
expand their use of animus under the Equal Protection Clause."
Professor Eyer first argues that, as a descriptive matter, equal
protection victories for modern social movements have been based
on claims of irrational government action (specifically, government
failure of rational basis review) rather than animus. Although she
admits rational basis review has been messy and incremental in
its successes for non-suspect classes, she argues that the animus
cases have been "only a bit player" in those successes, and thus
cannot be relied on to provide better protection than rational basis
review. 12

Professor Eyer goes on to identify two other potential problems
with using animus as a vehicle for seeking more expansive
constitutional protections. First, she argues that current animus
scholarship suggests that animus is a necessary component of a
successful equal protection claim. Elevating animus, which
Professor Eyer describes as "a serious charge indeed," to the
"central factor that allows meaningful scrutiny outside the
heightened tiers" of equal protection analysis creates problems of
meaning and proof that could transform animus from what its
proponents see as a galvanizing and clarifying force to a "gate that
will largely remain closed" for plaintiffs.13 This is evidenced, she
argues, in the Court's restrictive use of animus in Trump v.
Hawaii,14 and will only be compounded in the lower courts (which
decide the vast majority of equal protection cases involving nonsuspect classes), as those courts are even less likely than the
Supreme Court to find animus from their position "at the front end
of generating constitutional change."
Professor Daniel Conkle approached Professor Araiza's work
from a different perspective. He concurs that animus doctrine is
uncontroversial as a matter of constitutional principle. He explains
that lawmaking based on "bias, dislike, or disfavor" toward the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 193.
Katie R. Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215 (2018).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226, 229.
Id. at 230-33.
Id. at 229.
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regulated
group
"violates
deep-seated
constitutional
understandings and should be regarded as categorically
impermissible."" Professor Conkle is less sanguine about animus
doctrine, however, when it is viewed through the lens of "judicial
prudence," which he defines as consisting of two distinct concepts:
judicial workability and judicial statesmanship. 17
Professor Conkle is concerned about the workability of the
animus doctrine because he thinks animus may be difficult to
define in some cases, including mixed-motive cases, where "a law
is based in part on animus but in part on other, public-regarding
objectives."" Despite Professor Araiza's suggestion that the
Arlington Heights1 9 framework for resolving racial discrimination
claims could clarify courts' approaches to animus claims, Professor
Conkle remains concerned that the number of issues raised in
mixed-motive cases-such as whether animus must be only a butfor cause of the statute or have played a more significant role in its
adoption-will negatively affect animus doctrine's workability.
Judicial statesmanship presents a different challenge for the
animus doctrine. Professor Conkle argues that, by making an
animus finding, courts are necessarily issuing an "indictment of
those responsible for the law."2 0 This (often moral) condemnation
of lawmakers puts the court in an awkward position of disparaging
a coequal branch of government. What's more, Professor Conkle
acknowledges that such an indictment may be deserved in some
cases, putting a court in the even more awkward position of
choosing between its own integrity and publicly harming that of
the legislature. In response to his concerns about judicial prudence
and the animus doctrine, Professor Conkle advocates for the
application of heightened scrutiny to a larger range of
disadvantaged groups, with animus doctrine serving as a doctrine
of last resort when more traditional options for combatting
legislative bias or disfavor fail.21
Michelle Moretz offers a thorough and insightful analysis of a
current issue that potentially implicates animus-discrimination
16. Daniel 0. Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle and
JudicialPrudence, 48 STETSON L. REV. 195, 195, 199 (2018).
17. Id. at 197.
18. Id. at 202.
19. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252.
20. Conkle, supra note 16, at 204 (emphasis in original).
21. See id. at 211-12 nn. 93-94 and accompanying text (describing Moreno as a case
where animus doctrine may be useful as a doctrine of last resort).
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against LGBT employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.22 Although she does not engage with animus doctrine
directly, Moretz examines the history and relevant theories of
employment discrimination jurisprudence and concludes that
discrimination against LGBT plaintiffs should be actionable under
Title VII. She offers alternative approaches for those plaintiffs that
she contends are consistent with the courts' view of antidiscrimination law. First, she argues that courts should defer to
the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that
discrimination based on sexual orientation constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII. Alternatively, Moretz argues that
courts should use both the associational theory and the failure to
conform to gender norms approach to employment discrimination
to better focus courts on the precise problem at hand. This contextbased approach to equality jurisprudence under Title VII is
reminiscent of Professor Araiza's approach to constitutional
animus under the Equal Protection Clause.
In the final contribution to the symposium, Professor Araiza
generously responds to all three commentators. 23 He acknowledges
the significant common ground between himself and Professor
Conkle in terms of their view that animus is de facto prohibited
within our constitutional structure, but resists the notion that
judicial statesmanship should prevent courts from finding animus.
To the contrary, says Professor Araiza, the "very existence of a
political and social environment marked by xenophobia and deep
cultural conflict . . . requires a jurisprudence that is willing to call
out animus when it exists." 24 As for workability concerns, Professor
Araiza acknowledges the challenges inherent in employing animus
doctrine, but does not find them any more challenging or outside
of courts' expertise than other anti-discrimination doctrines. By
considering factors like the scope and context of the discrimination,
Professor Araiza contends that animus doctrine allows for the
types of distinctions between morality- and animus-based
arguments that Professor Conkle suggests are unworkable.

22. Michelle Moretz, Baldwin, Hively, and Christiansen, Oh My! Navigating the Yellow
Brick Road of Employment Discriminationfor LGBT Plaintiffs, 48 STETSON L. REV. 235
(2018).
23. William D. Araiza, Response: Animus, Its Critics, and Its Potential, 48 STETSON L.
REV. 275 (2018).
24. Id. at 280 (emphasis omitted).
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Professor Araiza also recognizes the commonality between his
and Professor Eyer's aspirations for animus doctrine and for equal
protection law more broadly. He disagrees, however, with
Professor Eyer's contention that animus doctrine could crowd out
traditional rational basis review and act as an unforgiving
gatekeeper to anti-discrimination plaintiffs that are not protected
by heightened tiers of scrutiny. He argues that animus doctrine,
much like the class legislation jurisprudence of the nineteenth
century, is designed to complement-not displace-traditional
rational basis review. He further contends that, because animus is
already an established concept in equal protection law, scholars
should avoid resisting it and focus instead on finding productive
ways to incorporate the doctrine into a broader constitutional view
of equality. Finally, rather than adopt Professor Eyer's view that
the Court's use of animus in Trump v. Hawaii was evidence of the
animus doctrine's potential to overwhelm traditional rational basis
review, Professor Araiza describes it as a further opportunity for
scholars to develop the doctrine apart from "pure irrationality"
cases. 2 5
He ends his response by highlighting two connections between
Ms. Moretz's Title VII analysis of employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and animus doctrine. Doctrinally
speaking, Professor Araiza points out that the associational theory
of discrimination discussed by Moretz and the courts dealing with
Title VII cases involving LGBT plaintiffs may offer an example of
a discrimination claim-based at least implicitly on "a state of
affairs in which the employer disapproves of the employee and her
choices, for example, her choices of intimate partner or family
relationship"-that sounds in animus doctrine.2 6 More generally,
Professor Araiza points out that the multi-dimensional analysis
suggested by Moretz in the Title VII context reflects the argument
in his book that "there are many paths to equality" for plaintiffs,
including through claims of animus.2 7
Professor Araiza's book reinvigorates the animus doctrine as
a powerful potential solution to a pressing national problemincreasingly bold and apparent evidence of government animus
against particular groups. This symposium offers an opportunity

25. Id. at 291.
26. Id. at 293.
27. Id.
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to develop and build on Professor Araiza's thesis. Its contributions
to our understanding of constitutional equality will no doubt
benefit us all.

